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1. Introduction
Progressive institutionalisation of the European Community
1 “finds it-
self caught between two opposing tendencies”2. The constitutional
principle of subsidiarity and national short-sightedness hinder integration
processes. On the contrary, mechanisms of globalization result in
a “world-wide integration”, preventing small actors from being heard at
the international stage or from participation in share of wealth. The only
way to preserve the privilege of enjoying the world’s highest liv-
ing-standards and the hope of fighting world’s poverty is to adjust to re-
quirements of the global economy3. Either the EC/EU, together with its
Member States, learn how to cooperate with ever more expansive interna-
tional organisations, or its own voice will gradually lose any magnitude.
In the paper I analyse certain problems of the EC cooperation with in-
ternational institutions. I focus upon cooperation based upon fix institu-
tional structures. As the latter only occasionally poses international legal
personality, the said cooperation exceptionally amounts to a membership
in an international organisation.
First I analyse difficulties which the European Community face while
following accession procedures to external institutional structures. In the
second part I scrutinize some aspects of the on-going cooperation. In the
end I highlight consequences of the EC non-membership in such struc-
1 The Common Commercial Policy, the first pillar of the EU, will be referred to as
the Economic Community, EC.
2 J. Sack, The European Community’s Membership of International Organisa-
tions, “Common Market Law Review” 1995, no. 32.
3 H. Mahony, Europe is increasingly fading away, “EUobserver”, 30 March
2007.
tures, both for the organisation itself and for its Member States, and some
consequences of the discussed constitutional reform.
2. Difficulties of accession to an international organisation
2.1. Constitutional restraints
Membership in international organisation may take place in two ways.
Either by participation in conclusion of an international organisation con-
stitutional treaty (original membership), or subsequently, if allowed by the
treaty, by following the accession procedure (derivative membership)4.
The European Community is no exception to the rule5. Its capacity of
concluding agreements with third countries has been first generally ac-
knowledged in the European Agreement on Road Transport judgment6.
The European Court of Justice recognized then that the capacity of estab-
lishing contractual links with third states arises not only from the express
treaty provisions, but also from other provisions as well as from measures
adopted within their framework by the Community institutions. Six years
later the Court expressly recognized the EC’s capacity of becoming
a founding-member of another international organisation. In the Opinion
on the ‘Draft Agreement establishing a European laying-up fund for in-
land waterway vessels’7 the Court acknowledged the EC’s authority to en-
ter into international commitments necessary for the attainment of specific
objectives, whenever the Community law has already created Community
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4 International organisation membership capacity, as an element of capacity of
maintaining international relations, is sometimes described as a constituent of interna-
tional legal personality. See: J. Menkes A. Wasilkowski, Organizacje Miêdzyna-
rodowe. Prawo instytucjonalne (International Organisations. Institutional Law),
Warszawa 2006, p. 97. See also: A. G. Toth, The Oxford Encyclopedia of the European
Community Law. Institutional law, Oxford 1990, Legal Personality of the European
Community (p. 351) and External relations (p. 256).
5 I. Govaere, J. Capiau, A. Vermeersch, In-Between Seats: The Participation of
the European Union in International Organisations, “European Foreign Affairs Re-
view” 2004, no. 9.
6 C 22-70, Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European
Communities. European Agreement on Road Transport, [1971] ECR 263.
7 Opinion 1/76, Draft Agreement on the establishment of a European Laying-up
Fund for Inland Waterway Vessels, [1976] ECR 1279.
powers within its internal system, even in the absence of express provi-
sions in that connection. In particular the ECJ recognized the right to “set
up an international organism, to give the latter appropriate powers of deci-
sion and to define […] the nature, elaboration, implementation and effects
of the provisions to be adopted within such a framework”. Currently Arti-
cle 300(3) of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC)
provides legal basis to conclude “agreements establishing a specific insti-
tutional framework by organizing cooperation procedures”. The said arti-
cle does not, however, directly refer to a different accession procedure to
an already existing organisation. Consequently it may be applied only by
analogy, which poses considerable practical problems8. In particular, on
the grounds of public international law, a capacity to conclude treaties by
the EC, does not amount yet, from the internal (Community) perspective,
to right of acceding another international organisations9.
Also particularities of the Community legal status affect possibilities
of membership of the Community in other institutional structures. Even
though legal personality of international organisations as such does not
raise concerns10, it’s extend is somewhat problematic11. This in turn influ-
ences the capacity of establishing inter-institutional relations.
The legal capacity of international organisations, defined on the
grounds of organisations’functions and powers, is not easily distinguished
from the legal personality12. In particular it is not clear, whether the legal
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8 More: see supra note 4, p. 157.
9 R. Frid, The European Economic Community. A member of a specialized agency
of the United Nations, “European Journal of International Law” 1993, vol. 4, no. 2.
10 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations ([1946] ICJ
Rep 174); also: L. Oppenheim “International Law”, 1996, 9th edition. Although there is
a general agreement that international organisations can posses legal personality, their
fundamental features raise serious concerns, just to mention legal basis of personality
(either expressly on the basis of organisation’s statute or impliedly in consequence of
obtaining autonomy); more: supra note 3, p. 137–145.
11 E. Steinberger, The WTO Treaty as a Mixed Agreement: Problems with the EC’s
and the EC Member States’ Membership of the WTO, EJIL 2006, vol. 17, no. 4.
12 The wording of constitutional treaties of international organisations results only
in greater confusion in that respect, as they freely use different terms without defining
them properly. The UN Charter refers to pusposes, functions and powers (Fr: buts,
fonctions et pouvoirs); the EC Treaty about organisation’s tasks (Fr. mission); the
WHO Constitution distinguishes the objective from functions (Fr: le but, les
fonctions); the UNESCO Constitution speaks of purposes and functions of the organi-
sation as opposed to the functions ot its organs (Fr: buts et fonctions, les fonctions). Al-
personality of international organisations is limited by their competences;
or rather the personality per se is unlimited, as opposed to organisation’s
attributed powers. If the legal personality was restricted by organisation’s
functions, in which case the legal personality would be identical to the ca-
pacity to incur the legal responsibility, then also the possibility to hold the
organisation legally responsible is limited. That is, what the International
Court of Justice’s asserted in the Advisory Opinion on Reparation for In-
juries suffered in the service of the United Nations13. Accordingly the
EC14, as any other international organisation, would be incapable of un-
dertaking external actions outside the scope of its capacity, since the sub-
ject existing only within the limits of its competences cannot exceed them.
In particular an accession to any institutional framework, whose functions
are defined broader than those of the European Community, would be im-
possible. If accept unrestricted character of international organisations’ le-
gal personality, the latter can be held responsible also for ultra vires acts
similarly to states. This is what the International Law Commission sug-
gests in its works on responsibility of international organisations15. An-
swer to those questions is fundamental for the possibility of accession to
each particular international institution; it shapes membership rights and
ways of realising membership benefits. The extent to which a membership
in an external institutional structures can influence the European Commu-
nity itself, can be seen in the EJC’s opinion on “Draft agreement between
the Community, on the one hand, and the countries of the European Free
Trade Association, on the other, relating to the creation of the European
Economic Area”16. The Court acknowledged there that the Community
252 Marcin Menkes SP 3 ’09
ternate use of those terms contradicts the principle of language rationality, providing
for distinct meaning of different notions. As a result distinction between the motivation
for cooperation, stipulated results, afforded means of action and their results seem to
evaporate.
13 Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations, Advisory
Opinion: ICJ Reports 1949, p. 174.
14 The legal personality of the EC is founded upon by art. 281 TEC, criticized for
its curtness while compared to its predecessor – art. 6 of the Treaty establishing the Eu-
ropean Coal and Steal Community. See: supra note 3 p. 143.
15 M. Menkes, Odpowiedzialnoœæ organizacji miêdzynarodowych w pracach Komisji
Prawa Miêdzynarodowego (Responsibility of international organisations in works of
International Law Commission), “Warsaw University Law Review” 2007, vol. 1.
16 Opinion 1/92, Draft agreement between the Community, on the one hand, and
the countries of the European Free Trade Association, on the other, relating to the cre-
ation of the European Economic Area, [1992] ECR I-2821.
competence to conclude international agreements “necessarily implies
that the Community may accept rules made by virtue of an agreement as to
the sharing of the respective competences of the Contracting Parties”.
Consequently, although powers conferred upon the Community’s institu-
tions can be modified pursuant only the TEC procedures, “an international
agreement concluded by the Community may confer new powers on the
Court, such as the power to interpret the provisions of such agreement,
provided that in so doing it does not change the nature of the function of
the Court as conceived in the EEC Treaty”. Still the interpretative freedom
concerning interinstitutional cooperation of the European Community is
restricted to “only those powers which have been conferred upon it”17.
2.2. Limitations of legal personality
The European Community’s legal capacity is bound by the principle of
attributed powers (art. 5 TEC). In terms of external relations only few pro-
visions, however, confer competences upon it18. There is no general clause
of competences alike art. 24 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU)19.
The restrictive effect of art. 5 TEC was fully exposed in the ECJ Opinion
2/9420. The Court stated that article 308, authorising actions where the
Treaty “has not provided necessary powers”, does not cover activities in
areas not included among objectives of the Community (articles 2–4
TEC). It is sometimes difficult to delimit in practice the accurate scope of
competences and to distinguish exclusive powers of the EC from compe-
tences concurrent/coexistent and shared with the EC Member States21.
Furthermore it is an ever-changing, dynamic image, as the competences
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17 Opinion 2/94, Accession by the Communities to the Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, [1996] ECR I-1759.
18 Art. 133 TEC on common commercial policy; art. 310 TEC on association
agreements; art. 310 TEC on competition; art. 181 TEC on development cooperation;
art. 174 TEC concerning the environmental protection and art. 181a TEC on economic,
financial and technical cooperation.
19 EU on the other hand has not been expressly granted legal personality.
20 See supra note 4. According to ECJ even though respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms remains a precondition for legality of community legal order,
protection of those rights as such does not belong to the organisation’s objectives.
21 C. D. Ehlermann, Mixed Agreements. A list of Problems, in: Mixed Agreements,
edited by D. O’Keeffe, H. G. Schemers, Deventer 1983.
can be transferred upon the Community expressly by Member States, by
application of the doctrine of implied powers on the basis of the ERTA
judgement (a safeguard for the effet utile of EC law22), or where such
a transfer would be “indispensable for the achievement of the internal ob-
jectives of the Community” accordingly to the Opinion 1/7623. As a result
EC’s partners face two phenomenon. On the one hand they witness an in-
ternal transfer of competences, on the other an evolution of the Commu-
nity capacity to conclude international agreements24.
If, due to internal division of powers, the Community becomes a mem-
ber of an institutional structure along with its Members States, on the basis
of a mixed agreement, such cooperation may result in widening of EC’s
own capacity of concluding international agreements. This will occur, if
the mixed agreement in question consists of one agreement between the
EC and its partner and another between the Community and its Member
States on the basis of which the latter transfer necessary powers upon the
EC. The same will happen, if the mixed agreement consists of two parallel
agreements between the EC and its Member States on the one side and
other partner on the other. If such an agreement binds entirely the Commu-
nity, then its Member States may decide whether to transfer or share the
necessary powers with the organisation. If the EC becomes a party only to
some part of the agreement, its ius tractatuum remains unaltered. The last
option is the least favourable to third-partners, however25.
Another consequence of limited legal capacity of the EC are mixed ne-
gotiations. For the same reason the European Community cannot become
a full member of any international agreement, it cannot alone negotiate
agreements, on the grounds of which it will become a member of institu-
tional structures together with its Member States. As a result the course of
negotiations depends on three factors. Composition of a European delega-
tion, division of powers between the Community and its Member States
and the principle of the Community solidarity. To composition will vary
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22 ERTA, Draft Agreement of the establishment of a European Laying-up Fund for
Inland Waterway Vessels ([1977] ECR 741).
23 See also: supra note 10, p. 848.
24 A. Cieœliñski, Kompetencje Wspólnoty Europejskiej do zawierania umów
miêdzynarodowych w œwietle orzecznictwa Europejskiego Trybuna³u Sprawiedli-
woœci, in: Wspólnoty Europejskie (Unia). Wybrane problemy prawne, cz. II, ed.
J. Kolasa, Wroc³aw 1998.
25 A. Bleckman, The Mixed Agreements of the EE in the Public International Law,
in: “Mixed Agreements”, supra note p. 155.
from a single European delegation taking part in bilateral negotiations, to
more complex rules of composition of delegations for multilateral negoti-
ations26.
Supposing that the very accession/membership is legally possible, the
question of representation raises subsequent problems. Depending on
whether the particular act falls within the scope of competences of the EC,
the EU or the Member States, accordingly the Commission (art. 300–304
TEC), the Presidency (art. 18 TEU), national governments or combination
of those actors will be entitled to act in foro externo27. Such system hap-
pens to provoke intense quarrels among those concerned (discussed fur-
ther in par. 4).
2.3. Policy obstacles
Alongside above concerns two factors merit consideration: internal re-
lations with the EC Members States and partner-organisations reluctance.
As for the former, one shall not forget that the external policy, includ-
ing membership in international organisations, has been traditionally per-
ceived by States as an integral part of sovereignty. Similarly the EC
Member States are reluctant when it comes to transfer competences in that
area28, on the one hand willing to increase importance of the European
voice at international forum by acting outside together, on the other hand,
afraid of losing “national identity”29, or at least of diminishing their own
political presence. It takes a hard step-by-step process to obtain each con-
cession, as European States remain unwilling to rescind their international
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26 A single European delegation consists of the European Commission and Mem-
ber States representatives; representative of the state of Presidency takes the chair of
the delegation. The EC may also send its own delegation separate from national dele-
gations. Also there are several mixed models. For instance including representatives of
all Member States in the EC delegation or one representative of the State of Presidency
(this is the practice at the UN General Assembly forum); since the 1967 GATT negoti-
ations Kennedy Round the EC together with its Member States do also send a common
delegation. J. Groux, Mixed Negotiations, w: Mixed Agreements, supra przypis.
27 More: see supra note 4; also J. Groux, Mixed Negotiations, in: supra note 17.
28 A. Wasilkowski, Suwerennoœæ w prawie miêdzynarodowym i prawie Euro-
pejskim (Sovereignty in international and European law), in: Prawo Miêdzynarodowe
Publiczne a prawo Europejskie. Konferencja Katedr Prawa Miêdzynarodowego
w Karpaczu; 15–18 Maja 2002, eds. J. Kolasa, A. Koz³owski, Uniwersytet Wroc³awski.
29 See supra note 17.
presence for the benefit of the Community. That is the main reason behind
the parallel membership of all 27 European States in the WTO in their own
rights.
Referring to the latter restraint, the Community may also be incapable
of becoming a member of an institutional structure due to its constitutional
restraints. Among other doubts, such a membership raises question about
equality of the Members States, since usually States belonging to the “ac-
ceding organisation” (here the EC), are already members of the other
organisation. Consequently membership of the EC amounts to double
membership of European countries (“directly” and “through the Commu-
nity”). To prevent that happening, some international organisations are
opened for states only30. This leaves the EC no other choice than accepting
an observer status (as it did in the International Labour Organisation), and
purely advisory role. This might be particularly problematic in terms of
Community internal legal order, if the subject matter of such organisation
belongs to Community exclusive competences, in which case the EC op-
erates “through the medium of the Member States”31.
Also reluctance of third States may hinder cooperation. Imprecise legal
nature of the EC and ever-evolving nature of internal division of powers
leaves third parties in a situation of uncertainty32, as to who is competent
to act in particular situation, or who would be responsible for breaches of
international obligations – especially in case of mixed agreements33. Also
the very exercise of membership rights may be a reason for considerable
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30 In such situation it is a question of good will of other parties, whether to enable
accession of the EC. For instance the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO)
amended its Constitution and General Rules in 1991 (see: paragraphs 376 – 379 of the
Report of the twenty-sixth Conference of FAO, Rome, 9–27 July 1991, X5587/E), al-
lowing accession of “regional economic integration organisations”.
31 Opinion 2/91, Convention No 170 of the International Labour Organisation
concerning safety in the use of chemical work ([1993] ECR I-061).
32 Having that on mind, the ECJ stated that despite transfer of competences upon
the Community, which took place during ERTA case proceedings (supra note 18),
a sudden change of negotiators, by exclusion of European States delegations, at such
late stage of negotiations would endanger conclusion of the treaty, therefore the Mem-
ber States retained their presence in the course of negotiations “in the name of the Eu-
ropean Union”. More: see supra note 4, p. 173–174.
33 On the other hand it happens sometimes that those are third States who insist on
the accession of the EC Member States, alongside the Community, as they are not con-
vinced about possibility of executing their rights against the Community (as it oc-
curred with the African, Caribbean and Pacific ACP States).
uncertainty. Complexity of problems arising at that stage may be seen on
the example of the EC membership in the WTO, which relates to exclu-
sive, concurrent and coexistent competences of the Community34.
3. Membership hurdles
3.1. Voting rights
A successful finishing of accession procedure does not solve yet all the
difficulties. For instance voting rights. Shall the Community be given an
extra voting competence in its own right, separately from its Member
States35, according to the principle of equality of members, or rather shall
it vote instead of the Community Members States, according to the, pre-
venting over-representation, principle of neutrality which. What shall be
the power of such vote – cumulative right consisting of all previously pos-
sessed by the EC states or rather only one vote36.
3.2. Alternate exercise of the membership rights
As provided by the FAO’s Constitution (CFAO)37, although member-
ship of “regional economic integration organisations” (REIO) is accessory
to membership of respective Member States, REIOSs are entitled to exer-
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34 In LAN case (LAN Case, Customs Classification of certain computer equip-
ment (Panel Reports WT/DS62/R,WT/D67/R I WT/D68/R of 5th February 1998) it
wasn’t even clear, who shall be a party to the proceedings – only the Community or the
Member States or a joined representation. Unfortunately none of the WTO dispute set-
tlement organs wanted to give express answer upon this questions, and the sentence is
perceived as rather averting from doing so, than clarifying the issue. More: see supra
note 10.
35 As it is the case under art. 10(3)(a) and 14(b) of the Protocol of the Madrid
Agreement concerning Registration of Marks of 27.06.1989 (http://www.wipo.int/ma-
drid/en/legal_texts/trtdocs_wo015.html).
36 For instance as provide art. XII (3) and (4) of the Canberra Agreement of
20.05.1980 on the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources ([1982] Austra-
lian Treaty Series No. 9).
37 Art. II (4), (8),(9) and (10) of the CFAO (http://www.fao.org/DOC-
REP/003/X8700E/x8700e00.htm).
cise their rights, in the field of exclusive competences, on its own behalf,
independently of their Member States38. Two competence declarations are
necessary, however39. First, a general declaration to finalise accession
procedure40. Such declaration is complemented by specific statements on
every item of the agenda at each FAO meeting. If no statement is made,
competence is presumed to lie with the Member States41.
As a result an overwhelming amount of administrative paper work is
necessary, due to fears both of the EC States, not to create a precedent to be
used outside the FAO, and third parties, of exercising double member-
ship42. This may result in disputes despite meritorical consensus between
parties, as shows the following example.
In field of shared competence the exercise of the voting right depends
on the adoption of a Common Position. If none was established the Mem-
ber States vote at their will. If a Common Position has been settled then,
depending on who is competent in the matter to be voted upon, either the
Commission or the Member States will cast the vote. Soon after the EC ac-
cession to the FAO fisheries agreements were negotiated. The original
scope of negotiations was qualified as a “shared competence” area43. The
Commission and the Council reached an agreement establishing the Com-
mon Position. The question was who shall cast the vote. The Commission
argued that the actual subject matter of the agreement lied within Commu-
nity functions, so it was in the right. The Council disagreed. In the end the
Member States casted votes. Subsequently the Commission brought an ac-
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38 Accession of the EC to the FAO was a mile step in terms of international institu-
tional law for at least two reasons. Firstly, due to the growing consent from that mo-
ment onwards, even though such situation did in fact “in smaller scale” occur also
before, for international organisations membership in other organisations. Secondly,
for the first time the EC was permitted into the UN family. Since all the UN specialized
organisations are based upon same principles, numerous countries, afraid of setting
a precedent, were very reluctant to let that happen. More: see supra note 6.
39 Similar procedure was introduced for the EU – UNCTAD cooperation. There
however, due to a “lower significance” of common statements, which does not raise
fears concerning precedents to be followed under other institutional frameworks, the
specific declarations are made only if necessary.
40 Art. LXI(2) of the rules of procedure of the FAO.
41 Art. II (6) CFAO.
42 More: see supra note 1.
43 As a matter of fact, despite original ambitions, provisions on flagging, area of
the exclusive competence of the Member States, were not included in the final agree-
ment. Legal classification of the agreement, however, was not changed.
tion for annulment before the ECJ44. The Advocate General Jacobs45 dis-
missed the case as an inadmissible “non-issue”, as there was no true
disagreement between the parties, particularly having in mind that both
the Commission and the Member States are bound by Common Positions.
The Court, however, did not agree with that opinion. The ECJ stated that
question of exercise of voting right is not of the procedural character, but
touches upon the very essence of membership rights. Furthermore such
a depreciating attitude could lead in a long-term to waste of the hard-won
benefits of the EC membership in the FAO46.
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea provides yet another exam-
ple of difficulties made to the EC, without clear legal ratio legis. On the
grounds of art. 4(3) of the annex IX, the EC exercises its voting rights, ac-
cording to internal its internal division of powers, only in the presence of
representatives of the Members States. Such obstacle, concerning the field
of the EC exclusive competences, seems unjustified.
3.3. Finances
Also particularities of the EC legal character may result in widening of
some of its membership rights. On the basis of art. XVIII (2) CFAO, Mem-
ber Nations47 and Associated Members are obliged to different fiscal con-
tributions. Furthermore, Member Organisations are expected to cover
only membership administrative costs (art. XII (6) CFAO). They are not
entitled to take vote on the budget at conferences, however. This can be ex-
plained by the fact that membership of a REIO is only possible, if majority
of its members are also FAO members, thus obliging the REIO to pay en-
tire membership fee would double the fiscal burden carried by those
States. Since REIOs almost do not contribute to the FAO’s budget, they
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44 C-25/94, Commission v. Council ([1996] ECR I-1469).
45 Ibidem.
46 While focusing on the manner of exercising membership rights by the European
States, cooperation with the Security Council of the UN and the Organisation for Secu-
rity and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is worth recalling. Whenever a national repre-
sentative of the EU Presidency State takes the floor, he does so in the name of the entire
EU. In the OSCE a there is also known a customary right of the EU Presidency-country
representative to use a “Presidency” plate. K. Wolfke, Practice of International Or-
ganisations, “The Polish yearbook of international law” 1966/67, p. 183–194.
47 The notion of “member nations” was used in the original treaty, which also indi-
cated that in order to allow EC membership it was necessary to amend the Constitution.
are also not entitled to vote in relevant matters48. This may cause problems
in case of self-financing, autonomous REIOs. To some extent the EC is al-
ready in such situation; accordingly the Community shall rather cover en-
tire membership fee and enjoy all privileges49.
Surprisingly it is a one-way logic. For instance the European Court of
Justice, advisory opinion 1/9450, stated that financial contributions of the
EC Members States do not justify per se their participation in the conclu-
sion of the WTO Agreement51.
3.4. Protecting Community autonomy
Just as fearful of deprivation of their sovereignty States are reluctant to
transfer competences on the EC, the European Community tends to secure
its hardly-attained autonomy. This is particularly true while considering
accession to another institution, whose functions are parallel to those of
the EC. In such situation the Community may want, on the one hand, to
secure safety of its legal order, on the other hand, to prevent possible colli-
sions between two systems. Such were the arguments concerning acces-
sion of the EC to the European Patent Convention (EPC).
The ratio legis of intellectual property rights harmonisation was to se-
cure creation of the single European market by preventing creation of
monopolies over products and technologies interfering with the free
movement of goods, which in turn would undermine the EC competition
law policy. Despite numerous legislative activities52, the Community still
did not manage to harmonise entire IP law. For instance in terms of patent
law, measure simplifying administrative procedures have been under-
taken, however, no EU patent as such exists53. In order to enhance eco-
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48 Budgetary negotiations are at the same time policy discussions, hence exclusion
from decision making process in those matters is more significant then it could seem.
See supra note 6.
49 More: see supra note 6, p. 252.
50 Opinion 1/94, Competence of the Community to conclude international agree-
ments concerning services and protection of intellectual property, [1994] ECR I-5267.
51 More: Jacques H. J. Bourgeois, The EC in the WTO and the Advisory Opinion
1/94: An Echternach Procession, 32 CML Rev (1995).
52 E.g. Directive 92/100 – Rental and Renting Directive, Directive 93/83 – The
Satellite and Cable TV Directive, Directive 93/98 – The Duration Directive.
53 The dispute over IP rights, whether to transfer this area to the EC competence or
not, has been particularly vivid during WTO accession negotiations. While the EC
nomic integration, it has been proposed to confer to the European Patent
Office (EPO) the right of granting European (Community) Patent54. One
of obstacles to this idea was that some parties to the EPC are not EU Mem-
bers and that the Convention does not belong to the Community legal or-
der. The Community had to ensure the compliance of the EPO organs with
the acquis communautaire and to safeguard the autonomy of its legal order.
That was the reason behind introduction of the Select Committee of the Ad-
ministrative Council into the EPC framework55. The Committee, composed
only of representatives of the EC and its Members States, is exclusively
competent in Community law matters. Its objective is respect for “the rele-
vant Community law”56. The purpose of its creation was twofold: on the one
hand third states are prevented from undertaking decisions affecting acquis
communautaire, on the other hand it guarantees external respect (within the
EPO) for Community regulations. As a result non-EC States are bound by
the EC internal regulations, thanks to adoption of parallel provisions57.
4. Cooperation beyond institutional ties
4.1. Cooperation through the EU Member States
Treaties concluded by the EC member states are not binding upon the
Community, unless it is also a party to it58. The same principle applies to
SP 3 ’09 Cooperation Between the European Union... 261
Member States were willing to retain relevant functions, the ECJ, Opinion 1/94 (supra
note 44), spoke in favour of joint competences necessary to conclude TRIPs Agree-
ment. More: see supra note 47.
54 The EPO already grants European patents, which are, however, a bundle of na-
tional rights, rather than a unitary European right. Discussions on introducing a single
Community patent, which have begun in 1970s, so far have led to a stalemate.
55 According to art. 145 EPC the Committee is set up “for the purpose of supervis-
ing the activities of the special departments set up under art. 143 (2)”.
56 Draft Article 149(i), EPC working paper.
57 Similar procedure has been introduced in the framework of the European Eco-
nomic Area, which allowed Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland to participate in the
Common Market, without accession to the European Union itself. Relevant Commu-
nity legislation, covered by the EEA Agreement, is introduced subsequently by deci-
sion of the EEA Joint Committee, consisting of respective representatives (art. 99, 100
EEA Agreement). More: see supra note 4, p. 168–170.
58 In contrast the EC Member States as well as the Community institutions are
bound by international obligations undertaken by the Community (art. 300(7) TEC).
obligations undertaken by the EC States as a consequence of accession to
another international institution. The question arises, however, how to
qualify obligations undertaken “in the name of the Community”. For in-
stance as a result of membership in the ILO, to which the EC cannot ac-
cede. If all the EU States are members of the former organisation and
functions of such organisation are covered by the field of exclusive com-
petence of the Community, “there seems to be no convincing reason why
such an international agreement […] should not also be considered bind-
ing for the EC”59. Otherwise, in case of infringement of treaty provisions,
emerges a danger of an inequitable shift of risk upon third States. Even if
the Community was incapable to make its Member States fulfil their inter-
national obligations, it would be unjust to allow a de facto membership of
the EC in an international organisation, in the field of exclusive EC com-
petences, providing the Community with membership benefits without
legal possibility of compelling it to fulfil its obligations. Once such re-
sponsibility is accepted, then it is up to the Community to evaluate
whether possible benefits of such cooperation outweigh risks60.
4.2. Attribution of responsibility
Also non-membership of the Community in certain institutional struc-
tures may have far reaching consequences for its Members States. For in-
stance the EC is not a party to the European Convention on Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and therefore it does not have locus
standi in the European Court of Human Rights. Consequently a person
whose conventional rights were violated has no other choice, than to sue
the EC Member State(s), on territory of which the violation took place61,
even if such State was not necessarily involved in the said act62 or con-
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More: G. Conway, Breaches of EC Law and the International Responsibility of Mem-
ber States, EJIL 2002, vol. 14, no. 3.
59 See: supra note 4, p. 176.
60 More: Fourth report on responsibility of international organisations, by G. Gaja,
special rapporteur of the International Law Commission (A/CN.4/564). Also: see su-
pra note 12.
61 “The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction
the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention” (Art. 1 ECHR).
62 In Guérin (Guérin Automobiles v. les 15 Etats de l’Union Européenne, EctHR,
judgement of 4 July 2000, App. No. 62023/00) all the fifteen EU members were
tested it63. Also it is possible that the infringement of the ECHR concerns
are in which a State is not competent, or its actions were undertaken to ful-
fil other international obligations.
The first defence was unsuccessfully raised by the United Kingdom in
the Matthews64 case, where the Court stated that the defendant was respon-
sible for preventing a British citizen from participation in Gibraltar elec-
tions to the European Parliament, or rather not providing such opportunity,
despite the previous transfer of competences in this field upon the Euro-
pean Community. Consequently the defendant was not relived from its re-
sponsibility on the grounds of the ECHR.
Now in Bosphorus65 case actions of Irish authorities, implementing the
EC law66, were challenged as allegedly infringing fundamental right of
property of the claimant. Although on the facts of the case the applicant’s
claim has been rejected, it was Community attitude towards human rights
protection which was under inquiry rather than the State acts. The Court
repeatedly stated that State actions undertaken in compliance with previ-
ous international obligations are justified, “as long as the relevant organi-
sation is considered to protect fundamental rights […] in a manner which
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charged, even though none of them implemented questioned EU act. They were there-
fore held responsible for acts of the independent from Member States EC institutions
(otherwise the Community wouldn’t a subject of international law). More: S. Do-
uglas-Scott, Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v. Ireland, ap-
plication No. 45036/98, judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (Grand
Chamber) of 30 June 2005, (2006) 42 E.H.R.R. 1, 43 CML Rev (2006).
63 In Senator Lines (Senator Lines GmbH v 15 Member States of the EU, ECHR,
judgement of 10 March 2004; App. No. 51717/99) the action was brought against all
the Member States, even though Germany actually supported claimant’s arguments in
the Court of First Instance.
64 Matthews v. the United Kingdom, ECtHR 1999-I (Grand Chamber); App.
No. 55672/00.
65 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizim Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v. Ireland, ECtHR
(Grand Chamber), judgement of 30 June 2005, App. No. 45036/98, 42 E.H.R.R.1.
(2006).
66 Precisely art. 8 of the Council Regulation (EEC) No. 990/93 of 23 April 1993
(O.J. 1993, L 102/14) concerning trade between the EEC and the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro, which embodied previously established by the
Community embargo on trade with the FRY. More: I. Conor, Can two walk together,
except they be agreed? The relationship between international law and European law:
the incorporation of United Nations sanctions against Yugoslavia into European
Community law through the perspective of the European Court of Justice, 35 CML
Rev (1998).
can be considered at least equivalent to that for which the Convention pro-
vides”67. Otherwise a Member States can be held responsible for the Com-
munity institution acts68. Nb. the Court did not consider at all the United
Nations contribution towards the situation. The said Community Regula-
tion only implemented the Security Council Resolution at the Community
level, therefore merely fulfilling the EC’s obligations (discussed later).
This raises another legal problem of internal, Community character.
Economic sanctions – an instrument of commercial policy – fall under the
first CCP pillar. As they serve non-economic purposes, however, as in the
mentioned above example, they may result from non-commercial legal
obligations. There is a considerable conflict potential between functions
and procedures of the first and second pillar69. This just an example of im-
practicability of the rigid distinction between economic and political as-
pects of the European cooperation, which is all the more important in
terms of political decisions concerning establishing cooperation with
other international organisations in the CCP field70.
4.3. The ECJ’s role
Another factor to take into account while considering coordination of
distinct institutional mechanism is role of independent judicial organs.
I already mentioned a situation in which common market goals may be
closely related to question of human rights protection. The possible colli-
sion of those systems, Community law and the EHCR legal order, can also
result from different functions of the two. In the Rutili judgement71, the
ECJ acknowledged the fact that all the EEC States are also members to the
ECHR and recognized the “particular role” of the convention. Since then
the convention became a material source of fundamental rights, referred to
as general principles of the Community law, and the rights guaranteed
there became a condition of legality of Community acts. The Convention
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67 A construction which has been repeated following the judgement M. & Co v.
Germany, ECtHR, App. No. 13258/87.
68 More: see supra note 64.
69 P. Eeckhout, External Relations of the European Union. Legal and Constitu-
tional Foundations, p. 422–465.
70 S. Giller, B. Weidel, External Economic Relations and Foreign Policy in the Eu-
ropean Union, in: S. Griller, B. Weidel (eds.), p. 5.
71 Rutili, case 36/75, Receueil, no. 14.
did not become, however, a formal source of law. As a consequence the
EC judges interpret the EHCR autonomously “within the scope of applica-
tion of the Community law”, in view of EC functions. Even after the Co-
penhagen Declaration72, confirming special role of the Convention, the
risk of contrary interpretations of the Convention by both courts remains
considerable.
4.4. Supremacy of the UN Charter
Due to internal and external obstacles the European Community can-
not, at the present stage, accede to the United Nations. As for the former
reason, more important from the EC perspective, UN primary field of in-
terest concerns issues of the EU second pillar, the Common Foreign Secu-
rity and Policy. Although the European Union is competent in this area, it
can act only on the basis of a Common Position; not to mention concerns
about Union’s legal personality. Efficient participation of the organisation
in the UN works would be extremely difficult upon such basis. In particu-
larly due to the fact that if a Common Position was not established, Mem-
ber States may act as they will (art. 19(2) TEU). Also the CFSP is placed
only under political control of the Council (art. 11(2) TEU); excluded
from the jurisdiction of the ECJ (art. 46 TEU). Inefficiency of such mecha-
nism could have been observed during the 2003 Iraq crisis when some of
the EU States, including Poland, ignored a Common Position providing
for further weapon inspectors, by contribution towards measures under-
taken by the USA. Also the UN is open for States only (art. 4 UN Charter)
and any soon modification of the UN Charter seems very unlikely.
As UN Security Council resolutions usually concern security and for-
eign affairs issues73, which fall outside of the Community pillar, it is rare
for the ECJ to denounce upon those matters. It happens, however, that
relations between economic and security measures are inseparable – for
instance economic sanctions. This might be a reason of considerable diffi-
culties for the EC Member States. As the UN members they are obliged to
carry out Security Council decisions, i.e. implement economic sanctions,
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72 Declaration of the Commission of April 5, 1977, “Journal Officiel de la
Communauté Éuropéenne”, no. C. 103 of April 27, 1977.
73 S. Bohr, Sanctions by the United Nations Security Council and the European
Community, EJIL 1993, vol. 4, no. 2.
which fall under the CCP pillar. The EC, exclusively competent in the first
pillar, is not bound by acts of the Security Council. From the international
law perspective the situation does not pose any problems, since obliga-
tions under the UN Charter prevail over others (art. 103 UN Charter). Al-
though the EC is usually willing to cooperate, problems sometimes
emerge (as in the mentioned above Bosphorus case). In Centro-Com74
case the EJC had to pronounce upon questioned Community sanction
Regulation, only partially implementing original UN sanction Resolution.
The Court acknowledged on that occasion that the EU Members States are
bound by the UN Charter and they must undertake appropriate measures
where necessary. However, if such actions concern area of the CFSP be-
longing to the national competences, the Member States must “respect
provisions adopted by the Community”75. Subsequently the Court stated
that if “an international agreement allows, but does not require, a Member
State to adopt a measure which appears to be contrary to the Community
law, the Members State must refrain from adopting such a measure”76.
5. European Union constitutional treaties
Two attempts of passing some form of “constitutional treaty” of the
European Union failed. As it is yet unclear if Ireland, possibly also other
opponents, will be asked to reconsider their decision or rather the latest
treaty will be rewritten. Still having discovered that despite the latest en-
largement, the EU is still capable of working; with Europe currently con-
cerned with global financial crisis or situation in Georgia and its energetic
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74 C-124/95, Centro-Com, [1997] ECR I-81.
75 Ibidem.
76 In case when UN measures were not implemented at the EU level, the ECJ ac-
knowledged, on the grounds of art. 307 or art. 297 TEC, two scenarios. On the basis of
art. 307 TEC “the rights and obligations arising from agreements concluded before
1 January 1958 or for acceding States, before the date of their accession, between one
or more Member States on the one hand, and one or more third countries on the other,
shall not be affected by the provision of this Treaty”. It was raised on that occasion that
Germany joined the UN in 1973, thus its EC Treaty obligations predate those from the
UN Charter. Article 297 TEC contains an extinguishing clause “in order to carry out
obligations accepted for the purpose of maintaining peace and international security”.
Both measures can be applied only exceptionally, however. More: see supra note 4,
p. 181–182.
security; it does not seem as if subsequent reform attempt was to be soon
undertaken. Still the project deserves attention.
First, I shall underline that even though I analyse EU international co-
operation in the first pillar area, one should not believe mirage of harmony
of the three-pillar temple. The European Community, even though making
part of the EU institutional framework, is a separate body in terms of func-
tions, competences and powers. Subsequent constitutional treaties refer to
the entire European Union, whose foreign policy was only marginally
mentioned above. Both constitutional treaties meant to erase the EC and
the pillars-structure77. Despite single institutional framework the EU insti-
tution will still have different powers in different areas, however. Further-
more, although treaties are intended to simplify division of powers
between the EU and its Member States, they still distinguish exclusive,
shared and joined competences78. Even if Community cooperation and
membership with international institutions may seem confusing in terms
of Union position, the new unitary EU architecture will not clarify much.
5.1. European Union legal personality
As the EC is a fully-fledged international organisation, while legal per-
sonality of the UE raises serious doubts, it is sometimes suggested that the
Community remained an independent organisation, while the EU consti-
tutes rather a legal framework for coordinated cooperation79. If the reform
is successful, the EU coordination mechanisms and the EC will be re-
placed with a new legal person – the European Union80, capable of
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77 Although formally the pillar structure will be abolished, some argue that it is
more a matter of semantics than actual modification Union architecture. For instance,
according to the Constitutional Treaty provisions concerning external policies and ac-
tion and the CCP form common Title V, Part III (The Union’s external action). Differ-
ent modalities concerning particular polices remain, however, unaltered and the
former second pillar retains its intergovernmental character. Also the ECJ, with the ex-
ception of examining compatibility of negotiated international agreements with provi-
sions of the Constitutional Treaty (art. III-227, par. 12), does not gain jurisdiction in
this field. More: supra note 4, p. 186–188.
78 More: see http://europa.eu/constitution/index_en.htm.
79 Ch. Zacker, S. Wernicke, Prawo europejskie w pytaniach i odpowiedziach,
Warszawa 2000, s. 19–20.
80 Art. I-7 Constitutional Treaty.
concluding treaties and acceding to international organisations. Some
problems shall vanish, some remain (still there are no provisions concern-
ing procedure of accession to another international organisation), some
new may appear (according to the Constitutional Treaty the Minister of
Foreign Affairs, competent in matters of CFSP, may encounter conflict of
loyalties whilst acting as a Vice-President of the Commission.
Several concepts of legal architecture of the new European Union were
discussed. Not speaking in favour of any in particular, I shall underline an
important opportunity to consider. I mentioned above possibility of “ap-
propriation” of new competences by the EC. In the area of concurrent
competences this process may, however, occur in the opposite direction.
Speaking of the CFSP pillar, wherever there is no Community legislation
in force, the Council may shift decisions into the intergovernmental area.
If former Community pillar and Union policies become a homogenous le-
gal system, this may remove some obstacles of deepening external inte-
gration in the field of Community concurrent legislation, where there is no
secondary legislation81.
5.2. Human Rights
As mentioned above the Common Commercial Policy regulations may
be directly related to human rights protection. The situation shall change
a lot after the reform. Human rights protection is to constitute one of Euro-
pean Union values82 and to be included among internal and external objec-
tives83. As art. I-7(2) of the Constitutional Treaty proclaims, “The Union
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81 B. Weidel, Regulation or Common Position – The Impact of the Pillar Construc-
tion on the Union’s External Policy, in: External Economic Relations and Foreign
Policy in the European Union, eds. S. Griller, B. Weidel, p. 23.
82 Art. I-2: “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, free-
dom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the
rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member
States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity
and equality between women and men prevail”.
83 Art. I-3: “1. The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being
of its peoples. 2. The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and jus-
tice without internal frontiers, and an internal market where competition is free and un-
distorted. 3. The Union shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on
balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market
economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection
shall recognise the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of
Fundamental Rights which constitutes Part II of the Constitution”. Also
the EU will be permitted to accede to the European Convention on Human
Rights84.
6. Conclusions
Each stage of integration with other institutions is a new source of legal
and political difficulties; starting out with accession procedures and secu-
rity of the acquis communautaire up to legal problems of membership or
discriminatory treatment. Yet there can be no turning-back. On the one
hand the potential of globalization process as an incentive, on the other
risk of marginalisation at international arena, global challenges to face and
consequences as a result of non-integration as a warning. No matter which
is the driving force for broader and deeper inter-institutional cooperation,
the sooner Europe fully takes advantage of the opportunity the better for
everyone.
Streszczenie
Autor artyku³u analizuje pewne problemy dotycz¹ce wspó³pracy Wspólnoty Euro-
pejskiej z instytucjami miêdzynarodowymi. Autor koncentruje siê na wspó³pracy
z ustalonymi strukturami instytucjonalnymi. Jako, ¿e rzadko posiadaj¹ one miêdzyna-
rodow¹ osobowoœæ prawn¹, wspó³praca tylko wyj¹tkowo obejmuje cz³onkostwo w or-
ganizacji miêdzynarodowej.
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and improvement of the quality of the environment. It shall promote scientific and
technological advance. It shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall
promote social justice and protection, equality between women and men, solidarity be-
tween generations and protection of the rights of the child. It shall promote economic,
social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States. It shall respect its
rich cultural and linguistic diversity, and shall ensure that Europe’s cultural heritage is
safeguarded and enhanced. 4. In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall up-
hold and promote its values and interests. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sus-
tainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free
and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular
the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of inter-
national law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter”.
84 Art. I-7(2).
Najpierw autor analizuje trudnoœci, wobec jakich staje Wspólnota Europejska
w procesie dostosowania procedur akcesyjnych do zewnêtrznych struktur instytucjo-
nalnych. W drugiej czêœci opracowania autor podkreœla konsekwencje braku cz³onko-
stwa Wspólnoty Europejskiej w takich strukturach, dotycz¹ce zarówno tych struktur
jak i pañstw cz³onkowskich UE. Omówiono tak¿e pewne skutki omawianych reform
konstytucyjnych.
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